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Abstract 
We show that return mobility (the ability for migrants 
to return to their home regions) and the lifting of 
return barriers is a crucial enabling factor for the 
performance and growth of rural e-commerce 
businesses. We use a natural experiment involving a 
regional policy change, which reduced the barriers for 
rural migrants to return in one Chinese province but 
not in others. We find that after the policy change, 
rural e-commerce businesses in the province that 
implemented the policy change enjoyed a performance 
gain relative to those in other provinces. We also find 
higher rates of business founding and relocation to 
rural areas in that province post-policy change. 
Meanwhile, male-led rural e-commerce businesses 
enjoyed disproportionately larger performance gains 
than female-led businesses in that province. This study 
highlights the importance of return mobility and 
return barriers in structuring entrepreneurial 
activities.  
1. Introduction
Over 40% of the world’s population and 85% of
the world’s acutely poor reside in rural areas, where 
there is a dearth of entrepreneurial opportunities [1]. 
One potential enabler of rural entrepreneurship is 
return migration. Rural migrants who return to their 
home villages typically have worked urban jobs and 
possess higher levels of education, business 
experience, technical skills, and entrepreneurial 
tendency than rural residents who have never migrated 
[2]. Research on international migration also suggests 
that return migrants from advanced economies, after 
moving back to their home regions, helped create more 
entrepreneurial ventures and more innovation [3,4].  
However, rural areas rarely attract entrepreneurial 
migrants to return, as geographic isolation makes it 
difficult for rural businesses to access the urban 
market [5]. Some have suggested that digitization, 
which allows rural businesses to access the wider 
market remotely, may allow talented migrants to 
return home and work away from urban centers [6]. 
However, we have yet to see much evidence of online 
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entrepreneurship making inroads in rural areas [7]. 
Despite the potential of digital technologies to connect 
remote regions to the wider market and make distance 
less relevant, cities still offer a host of advantages over 
rural areas, including pooled resources and offline 
information channels [8]. Such rural disadvantages 
would likely dissuade rural migrants from returning 
and operating businesses from home.  
In this study, we investigate how return migration 
affects the patterns and performance of rural online 
entrepreneurship. Two related streams of research on 
mobility serve as guideposts for initial theorization. 
First, the literature on mobility and knowledge transfer 
conceptualizes individuals as conduits of knowledge 
[4]. Through  knowledge spillovers, individuals 
transfer valuable information and best practices to 
other individuals located their destination regions [9]. 
Knowledge is localized because collocated individuals 
exchange knowledge more easily, and national and 
regional borders demarcate different knowledge pools 
[10]. Due to these reasons, much of the literature finds 
that the mobility of individuals is associated with 
higher rates of entrepreneurship in the destination 
regions to which those individuals relocate [9]. 
A related set of research studies the effects of 
mobility barriers on economic and entrepreneurial 
outcomes. Current research in particular has focused 
on the role of noncompete agreements in the U.S. 
context. This research shows that noncompetes deter 
and redirect the mobility of high-skill workers 
including inventors and top managers, creating costs 
in acquiring new jobs and starting new businesses 
especially within jurisdictions where noncompetes are 
enforced [11]. Thus, noncompetes make it difficult for 
potential entrepreneurs to force a release from their 
current employers, thereby increasing the cost of 
recruiting from the labor market. The enforcement of 
noncompetes in Michigan resulted in a “brain drain” 
of inventors to other states where noncompetes were 
proscribed, and the brain drain effect was especially 
pronounced among more collaborative and more 
impactful inventors [11]. Broadly, the mobility 
research shows that increased worker mobility is 
associated with more entrepreneurship in workers’ 
destination firms or destination regions. There are two 






gaps in knowledge. First, we know little about talent 
mobility in the context of digital business and online 
entrepreneurship. Digital tools, usually provided by 
digital platforms, may open up new entrepreneurial 
opportunities in remote or underdeveloped areas, but 
relatively little evidence exists to show whether 
mobile individuals are indeed leveraging those tools to 
pursue entrepreneurship. Second, there has yet to be 
much research on return mobility and return barriers.  
We study a particular migration policy change 
that reduced the barriers to return migration in a 
specific region at a specific point in time. Leveraging 
this natural experiment, we causally estimate the 
impact of increased return mobility (reduced return 
barriers) on the patterns and performance of rural 
online entrepreneurship. We find that rural e-
commerce businesses (REBs) in one Chinese province 
that implemented the migration policy change 
(Jiangsu) saw 19% sales increase after the policy 
change relative to REBs in surrounding provinces that 
did not experience the same policy change during that 
time period. Jiangsu, after the policy change, also saw 
a higher rate of REB founding and a higher rate of 
urban e-commerce businesses relocating to rural areas 
relative to other provinces. Additionally, gender 
analysis reveals that male-led REBs in Jiangsu 
benefited disproportionately more than female-led 
REBs. Using a mechanism test, we show that the 
gender disparity is likely driven by the possibility that 
return migrants are mostly male and that male-led 
REBs are better able to absorb and utilize male return 
talent. To further strengthen the validity of our main 
results, we carry out a host of additional analyses: a 
focused analysis of performance effects at the Jiangsu-
Shandong border regions where local economies and 
cultures are highly similar, a synthetic control analysis, 
a between-effects analysis to highlight the 
generalizability of our results, and a placebo tests 
using data on urban businesses.  
This study provides two research contributions. 
First, it attempts to bridge the research on digitization 
with the mobility literature. As an increasing amount 
of entrepreneurship and business activities take place 
in the digital sphere, it is important to study whether 
and when the mobility of individuals affects the 
business landscape, especially in regions that are 
traditionally characterized as unfavorable destinations 
for mobile individuals. Existing research suggests that 
talent agglomeration remains important for knowledge 
transfer and entrepreneurship even in the presence of 
digital tools [11,12). This study shows that talent de-
agglomeration is indeed enabled by digitization, but it 
needs to be accompanied by flexible policy. Second, 
this study highlights the role of return mobility and 
return barriers in structuring economic and 
entrepreneurial outcomes in migrants’ home regions. 
Return mobility is understudied even though return 
migrants are an important driver of business and 
entrepreneurship [3]. Compared to the case of regular 
mobility barriers (e.g., immigration systems in 
developed countries), it is unclear whether the lifting 
of return barriers would lead to positive economic or 
entrepreneurial outcomes. This is because migrants’ 
home regions are often marked by a dearth of 
entrepreneurial opportunities, market access, and 
complementary assets – reasons why migrants 
migrated outward in the first place. These existing 
deficiencies may lower migrants’ desire to found new 
businesses in their home regions and, when they do, 
limit the performance and scalability of their 
businesses. Our study is among the first to highlight 
the presence of return barriers as a salient hindrance to 
local entrepreneurship.  
Additionally, this study provides practical lessons 
for digital platforms and for policymaking. Despite the 
potential of digital technologies to connect remote 
entrepreneurs with the wider market, talent is 
oftentimes the missing piece. By studying whether and 
when return migrants leads to higher-quality 
entrepreneurship in rural areas, our study informs the 
types of complementors platforms should focus on 
onboarding, especially regarding the development of 
platform business in remote and underdeveloped 
regions. This study also informs policymaking by 
showing how a confluence of technology and talent 
may enhance the rural entrepreneurial ecosystem and 
potentially aid economic development in rural areas. 
Meanwhile, the finding that female-led businesses 
underperform in the midst of increased return 
migration calls for more research and attention toward 
how different segments of entrepreneurs are affected 
by return migration. 
In Section 2, we detail the empirical setting, data, 
variable construction, and strategy for causal inference. 
In Section 3, we present the main results on the impact 
of return mobility on the performance and patterns of 
rural online entrepreneurship. In Section 4, we 
supplement the main results with additional analyses 
and mechanism tests. In Section 5, we conclude with 
a set of research, managerial, and policy implications.  
 
2. Setting and Data 
 
2.1 Migration Policy Change 
 
In this study, we exploit a migration policy 
change that was implemented in China’s Jiangsu 
province in November 2013. To understand the policy 
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change, one needs to first understand China’s long-
standing hukou residency system. The hukou is a 
population control system that has become one of 
China’s hallmark policies in the past sixty years. Most 
notably, it divides the population into residents 
carrying rural versus urban residency statuses and 
restricts the use of urban resources such as education, 
pension, healthcare, and housing to those with urban 
status only [13]. As a result, the urban status often 
appears highly desirable to many rural migrants 
working in cities. Although different provinces have 
different requirements for hukou acquisition, rural 
migrants typically need to show continuous urban 
employment and enrollment in the urban healthcare 
system for three to five years in order to receive the 
urban status [14]. Due to this requirement, low-skilled 
rural migrants, who tend to conduct manual labor and 
seek short-term labor contracts, would return home 
during down seasons, but high-skilled rural migrants 
tend to pursue the urban status and stay in cities [14]. 
Under the traditional residency system, migrants 
seeking urban status, who tend to be high-skilled and 
more talented, were required to spend most of their 
time in cities and could rarely return to their home 
villages. This barrier prevented them from fully 
engaging in the rural economy [15].  
In November 2013, a new residency policy was 
implemented in Jiangsu province. It introduced a new 
urban residency permit for rural migrants. Under the 
new system, a migrant can easily obtain an urban 
residency permit while still waiting in line for their 
official urban status [16]. Continuous urban 
employment and enrolment in urban health insurance 
would no longer be a prerequisite for obtaining the 
urban status, and the new permit can be phased into 
the urban status over time. An analogy to the western 
context is if the U.S. immigration system dropped the 
requirement that Green Card holders must stay in the 
U.S. for the majority of a year in a five-year period to 
be naturalized as citizens. Thus, the Jiangsu policy 
change gives many urban status-seeking migrants 
significant leeway to move back to their home villages 
because they may now carry their new residency 
permits and avoid losing their place in line for the 
urban status. 
 
2.2. Data and Variables 
 
2.2.1. Data Source. The data for this study were 
gathered from two sources. First, we acquired internal 
access to business-level panel data from a leading e-
commerce platform in China whose gross 
merchandise volume is on the order of 100 billion 
USD. On this “C2C” e-commerce platform, all 
businesses are operated by individual entrepreneurs as 
opposed to by the platform. The panel data for this 
study consists of 2,212 randomly selected e-commerce 
businesses located in the rural parts of eastern China. 
The window of observation is from May 2013 to April 
2014, the twelve-month window around the policy 
change in November 2013 (six months before and six 
months after). The data is at the business-monthly 
level. 1,594 of the REBs had listed products for sale 
for at least one month during the twelve-month 
window. Finally, time-invariant data was collected 
from national-, province-, prefecture-, and county-
level yearbooks and from local policy bureaus. This 
data is primarily used to construct the matching 
analysis and to conduct subsample analysis.  
2.2.2. Dependent Variables. The first dependent 
variable is a business’s monthly Sales performance. 
One feature of the dataset is that all monthly data on 
sales is normalized, meaning that the sales numbers 
are divided by one unknown number to ensure each 
entrepreneur’s anonymity. The average Sales in the 
dataset is 25.0 per month for businesses that sold 
products. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows 
that each unit of sales corresponds roughly to 60 USD, 
which means the average business makes about 1500 
USD in revenue per month. However, given the 
uncertain nature of this approximation, we take the 
logarithm of all sales numbers, log(Sales), and 
interpret effect sizes in percentage terms.  
The second dependent variable is a business’s 
Innovation performance. Common practice in the 
literature is to measure business’s innovation as its 
patent count. However, this practice does not extend 
well into entrepreneurship in the context of digital 
platforms, where businesses rarely patent. Instead, we 
measure innovation as the number of distinct products 
a business lists per month. The assumption is that an 
increase in the count of distinct product items signifies 
the enriching of one’s product line, which is an 
important form of innovation for online entrepreneurs. 
We take the logarithm of the number of products to 
interpret the effects in percentage terms. The third 
dependent variable is number of businesses founded 
(Num. Founded). Since it is difficult to study founding 
at the individual business level (all businesses in our 
sample have been founded at some point in time), we 
operationalize founding at the prefecture-month level 
and count the number of businesses founded in a given 
prefecture in a given month.  
2.2.3. Independent and Control Variables. The 
independent variable is the interaction term between 
the policy change variable Post-PC and the binary 
variable Jiangsu, which indicates whether a REB is 
located in Jiangsu province. Since the policy change 
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became effective in November 2013, we treat the 
months up until November as pre-change (Post-PC = 
0). The months starting in November 2013 will be 
considered post-change (Post-PC = 1). The interaction 
term thus becomes Post-PC X Jiangsu. 
Additionally, we control for a vector of business-
specific variables that might influence entrepreneurial 
outcomes. First, we control for the average price in a 
business’s product line, which is measured by taking 
the average of the prices of all products in a given 
month. Per data agreement, we only had information 
on the products in a business’s top three-grossing 
categories. Price data are normalized by an unknown 
number, and we take the logarithm of Price, log(Price) 
in our analysis.  Second, we control for the monthly 
average Buyer Rating (maximum score = 5) assigned 
by buyers to an online business in a given month. 
Finally, we include Month Dummies to control for 





2.3.1. Difference-in-Differences Design. The 
main relationship of interest is how Jiangsu REBs will 
perform relative to non-Jiangsu REBs after the policy 
change, which would allow rural migrants who were 
seeking urban status in Jiangsu cities to more easily 
return to their home villages/townships. To test this 
relationship, we carried out a straightforward 
difference-in-differences framework at the business-
month level, with sales as the dependent variables:  
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In this specification, 4!"  represents the time-
variant controls, and month dummies control for the 
time-specific effects. 2")324" 	× 	./'0#)1!  is the 
treatment variable, which equals 1 if a business located 
is in Jiangsu province when the province has already 
passed the new migration policy. Our main hypothesis 
predicts that the coefficient on the interaction term 
should be positive and significant. Finally, =!  is the 
business-level fixed effects, and 1!"  is the 
idiosyncratic error term. In this study, all regressions 
are estimated using business fixed effects. The 
standard errors are clustered at the province-level.  
The analysis for founding is conducted at the 
prefecture-month level. This is because every business 
in the sample had been founded before or during the 
window of observation, making business-level 
founding analysis difficult. Specifically, we estimate 
the changes in the rate of business founding after the 
policy change across different prefectures, using a 
similar difference-in-differences design as in the 
performance equation. The specification for founding 
analysis is presented below in Equation 2. The 
dependent variable is the number of new businesses 
founded in prefecture p, in month t. The last two terms 
are the prefecture-level fixed effects and the error term.  
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The identification strategy abides by the 
following logic. To measure the impact of the new 
migration policy on the performance of REBs, we 
would subtract the performance of REBs after the 
policy roll-out from the performance of REBs before 
the roll-out. However, other events and 
contemporaneous factors, such as macroeconomic 
trends, could also influence the patterns of REB 
performance. To ascertain that these factors do not 
affect the interpretation of our results, we 
simultaneously observe a control group of REBs 
whose performance change would likely be exposed to 
the aforementioned contemporaneous factors but not 
to the migration policy shock. By computing the 
“difference in differences” between the two groups of 
REBs, we thus obtain a causal estimate of the effects 
of the policy change on REBs. 
2.3.2. Validity of the Identification Strategy. 
The identification strategy needs to satisfy these 
conditions to be valid: 1) the treatment event 
(migration policy change) needs to bring about 
relevant shifts in migration patterns, and 2) the 
treatment needs to be exogenous with respect to the 
outcome variables related to entrepreneurship. To 
support the first condition, we need to show that the 
migration policy change resulted in more rural 
migrants, especially highly skilled migrants, returning 
to the villages. The pattern of returning talent is 
supported by the population data.  
In order for our identification strategy to satisfy 
the exclusion restriction, the policy change needs to be 
exogenous with respect to the performance of REBs 
and e-commerce performance in rural areas. Here, we 
address two specific concerns regarding the exclusion 
restriction. First, both the migration policy change and 
REB performance might have been driven by local 
economic trends in Jiangsu. For instance, Jiangsu’s 
overall economy could have experienced high growth 
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prior to the policy change, and the government could 
have aimed to reduce mobility barriers in order to 
continue the economic growth. In that scenario, 
Jiangsu REBs’ performance could have increased 
relative to that of REBs in other provinces due to the 
continuous flourishing of the rural economy instead of 
due to the policy change. Another possibility is that 
rural economy could have been in a slump in Jiangsu 
prior to the policy change, and the government might 
have decided to boost the rural economy with the new 
policy. In that scenario, Jiangsu REBs’ performance 
could have seen a relative increase due to regression to 
the mean instead of due to the policy change. To 
empirically address this concern, we first note that 
there was little fluctuation in rural economic growth or 
entrepreneurship in Jiangsu before the migration 
policy change, especially in comparison to the 
economic trends in nearby provinces. Additionally, we 
include control variables corresponding to local 
economic conditions, and we conduct a matching 
analysis that pairs Jiangsu REBs with REBs in other 




3.1. Business Performance  
 
Table 1 is the summary statistics and correlation 
matrix. Our main analysis relates to the performance 
(sales and survival) of REBs. When plotting the sales 
of Jiangsu versus non-Jiangsu REBs over time, the 
lines prior to the policy change suggest a lack of pre-
existing trends in terms of sales differences. After the 
policy change, the Jiangsu line is consistently situated 
above the non-Jiangsu line, indicating a relative 
increase in sales among Jiangsu REBs. Five months 
after the policy change, the average Jiangsu REB 
outperformed the average non-Jiangsu REB by about 
110% (in terms of dollar amount, roughly 2000 USD 
in monthly sales for Jiangsu REBs and 900 USD for 
non-Jiangsu REBs). Figure 1 maps the absolute 
change in average sales after the new policy for each 
province in our sample, showing that Jiangsu REBs 
experienced a particularly high sales increase.  
The regression results are reflected in Figure 2, 
which plots the Kaplan-Meier survivor curve for the 
relocation patterns of Jiangsu versus non-Jiangsu 
urban e-commerce businesses (UEBs). After the 
policy change, there is a visibly widening gap between 
the survivor rate of Jiangsu UEBs and that of non-
Jiangsu UEBs. In terms of overall statistics, whereas 
97% of the non-Jiangsu UEBs remained in urban areas 
by the end of the window (3% moved to rural areas), 
only 95% of the Jiangsu UEBs remained urban 
businesses (5% moved to rural areas). 
Additionally, we utilize coarsened exact matching 
(CEM) to create treatment REBs (Jiangsu) and control 
REBs (non-Jiangsu) that are highly similar along 
several variables in May 2013 (first month of the pre-
period in our analysis): entrepreneur’s gender, 
entrepreneur’s age, business age, average price, and 
customer review score. Coarsening these matching 
variables into strata, the matching yields 454 REBs 
(306 non-Jiangsu, 148 Jiangsu). Importantly, the 
method has decreased the overall imbalance between 
treatment and control groups by 20.2% (the L1 
measure decreased from 0.751 to 0.599). After that, 
we “feed” the matched sample of 454 REBs into the 
original difference-in-differences specification. The 
DiD results (available from the authors) show that 
Jiangsu REBs outperformed non-Jiangsu REBs by 
about 24% after the policy change (exp(0.219) – 1 = 
0.24; p-value = 0.01).  
 
3.2. New Business Founding and Performance 
 
We also examine the rate of founding of REBs in 
Jiangsu versus that in other provinces, before and after 
the policy change in November 2013. The founding of 
new businesses constitutes a measure of the extensive 
margin of the policy effects on total sales across 
regions. We only observe founded REBs in our sample, 
which makes it difficult to conduct the founding 
analysis at the business-level because there lacks a 
counterfactual group of potential entrepreneurs who 
do not end up founding businesses. Therefore, we 
aggregate the data to the prefecture-level and study the 
number of founding across prefectures over time. The 
unit of analysis is the prefecture-month, and there are 
75 prefectures in the sample. Results available from 
the authors. Whereas the number of foundings 
increased across the board after the policy change, 
prefectures in Jiangsu saw 0.54 more rural e-
commerce businesses being founded per month than 
prefectures in other provinces (p-value = 0.01). Note 
that this result should not be interpreted in absolute 
terms because our sample is a randomly selected 
subsample of the total population of e-commerce 
businesses. In light of the average number of 
foundings in our sample prior to the policy change 
(1.93 foundings per prefecture per month), this 
increase translates into a 28% increase in REB 
founding at the prefecture-level in Jiangsu relative to 
in other provinces. 
Next, we compare the relative sales advantage of 
existing REBs in Jiangsu over other REBs with that of 
the newly founded REBs in Jiangsu. This analysis 
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constitutes a measure of the intensive margin of the 
policy effects, as it evaluates whether it is the existing 
Jiangsu REBs or the newly founded Jiangsu REBs that 
are outperforming non-Jiangsu REBs. In our sample, 
63% of the REBs were founded prior to the policy 
change and 37% afterwards. To do this analysis, we 
include all the business-month observations in the six-
month post-period and regress REB sales over the 
interaction term Jiangsu X Founded After Policy 
Change and control variables in a set of pooled 
regressions. Regression results show that both existing 
REBs and newly founded REBs in Jiangsu have higher 
sales than their non-Jiangsu counterparts, but the 
coefficient on the Jiangsu X Founded After Policy 
Change interaction term is insignificant. In other 
words, the Jiangsu performance advantage observed in 
the main results can be attributed to both existing and 
new businesses doing better.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This study contains three main findings. First, the 
lifting of return barriers via a migration policy change 
altered the performance patterns of rural e-commerce 
businesses (REBs). Relative to non-Jiangsu REBs, 
REBs in Jiangsu (province that implemented the 
policy change) enjoyed a 19% performance gain after 
the policy change. Jiangsu REBs also created more 
innovative product portfolios than non-Jiangsu REBs. 
These results are supported by a battery of robustness 
checks including a CEM analysis, a border-region 
analysis, and a synthetic control analysis. Second, we 
observe a higher rural founding rate and higher rate of 
urban business relocation in Jiangsu relative to in other 
provinces. Third, we find substantial gender 
imbalance in our results: male-led REBs in Jiangsu 
enjoyed a disproportionately bigger performance 
advantage after the policy change than female-led 
Jiangsu REBs did.  
Our study contributes to the research on 
digitization and mobility. Despite the potential for 
digital tools to bridge gaps and bring about the “death 
of distance”, most businesses still prefer urban areas 
and hub regions over rural and non-hub regions. Urban 
areas offer more complementary products and services 
than rural areas, and this advantage allows urban 
businesses to conduct more complex activities 
digitally [12]. As digital technologies improve, those 
technologies increase the returns to innovative ideas 
and allow idea-producing cities such as New York and 
San Francisco to benefit disproportionately more than 
other cities [19]. With the rise of digital technologies, 
national and state borders seem to exert an even 
stronger constraining effect on knowledge diffusion 
[10]. Whereas prior research highlights the heightened 
importance of talent agglomeration and knowledge 
concentration in the era of digitization, our study 
provides some of the first empirical evidence that 
returning talent to rural areas may lead to successful 
online entrepreneurship. In the process, our study 
builds upon prior research by identifying a potentially 
critical condition for generating positive economic and 
entrepreneurial outcomes through digitization in 
remote and traditionally underdeveloped regions – the 
return of human talent. 
This study also enriches current understanding of 
mobility and entrepreneurship by foregrounding the 
concept of return barriers and return mobility. Most 
studies on mobility barriers focus on barriers that 
prevent individuals from moving from less developed 
regions to more developed regions. This study shows 
that return mobility is not a given: significant return 
barriers may impede migrants from moving back to 
their less developed home regions. Meanwhile, there 
exists a stream of literature on the economic and 
entrepreneurial impact of returnees in the international 
context. These studies have generally found that 
returnees, typically returning from more advanced 
economies to their home countries, cast a positive 
influence on the performance of local firms due to 
their possession of non-local knowledge and their 
ability to acquire resources more efficiently [3], 
especially when returnees are embedded in local 
networks [17]. More recently, Luo and colleagues 
conceptualize Chinese returnees from abroad as 
“institutional carriers,” who are uniquely able to 
transfer foreign ideas (e.g., corporate social 
responsibility practices) to local businesses [18]. 
Whereas these returnee studies generally treat the level 
of return migration as a given, our study shows that 
migrants’ decisions to return are non-trivial because 
migrants are hindered by pre-existing barriers, the 
lifting of which may generate new and better-
performing businesses. Moreover, our study also 
differs from prior work by focusing on return 
migration in the domestic, rather than international, 
context. In doing so, we show that within-country 
talent flow is an important source of entrepreneurial 
competence, especially for traditionally 
underdeveloped and non-hub regions.  
Our finding on gender differences contributes to 
the ongoing conversations on gender and 
entrepreneurship [20]. By showing that female-led 
REBs benefited less than male-led REBs from return 
migration, our study points to a potentially novel 
contributing factor to gender disparity in 
entrepreneurship: the ability of entrepreneurs to 
absorb and utilize mobile talent. Our mechanism test 
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suggests that one potential mechanism underlying the 
gender disparity is that most return migrants are male 
and male entrepreneurs are better able to communicate 
with and benefit from male returnees due to gender 
homophily. There is an important implication 
associated with this result: if most rural-to-urban 
migrants are male, their return to their home regions 
could worsen regional gender gaps in entrepreneurship. 
Meanwhile, there are likely other mechanisms driving 
the gender disparity, and future research may further 
explore the gendered dynamics between existing 
entrepreneurs and returning talent.  
Finally, this study provides an important set of 
policy implications. In their 2012 paper, Forman, 
Goldfarb, and Greenstein find that the spread of 
Internet adoption exacerbated economic inequality 
across regions [12]. They argue that a common pitfall 
of digitization policies is that those policies focus on 
physical and capital investments while largely 
neglecting the human capital aspect. This study 
provides direct evidence supporting the need for 
human capital to complement digitization effort. 
Specifically, it highlights the role of policymakers in 
enabling talent flows to accompany the dissemination 
of digital technologies. Interestingly, the policymakers 
behind the migration policy change in our study likely 
did not have digitization in their mind when designing 
the policy, suggesting that government policies need 
not be “digital policies” in order to spurt positive 
changes through the adoption of digital tools. Rather, 
governments and digital platforms may work together 
to create a confluence of technology and talent. 
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Figure 1. Mapping of REBs’ performance change in all regions. Color depth and text labels indicate change in 



















Figure 2. Survival analysis of urban e-commerce businesses (UEBs) moving to rural areas. Vertical red 




























Table 1. Summary statistics and correlation matrix (14,395 business-month observations). 
   
Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Sales 20.59 0.28 110.45 0.00 4266.00 1 
        
2 Num. Founded 5.87 4.00 6.15 0.00 31.00 0.01 1 
       
3 Innovation 7.95 2.00 25.71 0.00 768.00 0.30 -0.03 1 
      
4 Moved to Rural 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 1 
     
5 log(Price) 1.35 1.22 0.91 0.00 7.44 0.13 -0.01 -0.12 -0.02 1 
    
6 Buyer Rating 4.84 4.95 0.28 1.25 5.00 -0.05 0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.03 1 
   
7 Business Age 16.07 12.00 13.64 0.00 51.00 0.16 -0.06 0.14 -0.05 0.07 -0.07 1 
  
8 Jiangsu 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.04 -0.09 0.05 0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.03 1 
 
9 PostPC 0.62 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.20 -0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 1 
 
Note: We take the logarithm of sales in the actual analysis. In this correlation table, we show 
the unlogged sales variable to enable easier interpretation. The sales variable is multiplied by 
an unknown constant. We estimate through a back-of-the-envelope calculation (by finding the 
average monthly sales of a Chinese e-commerce sellers in 2013, which was roughly 1200 USD, 
and dividing that by the average normalized sales in our sample, 20.59) that one unit of sales 
roughly corresponds to 60 USD. Finally, the average age of the entrepreneur is early 30s (the 
dataset does not indicate the exact age of an entrepreneur, but divides it into age buckets), 
and 51% of the entrepreneurs are female.  
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